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Nature and Definition.
From a study of the New York cases, a chattel mort-
gage ma, be defined as a transfer of personal property,
which is in the nature of an absolute conveyance for a
security for money, obligation or for the perfonmance of
some act ; by such instrument the mortgagee acquires a
paramount and specific title upon the property described
tli--in, subject to be defeated by a perfonmance of the
condition and on a breach of the condition the mortgagee
has a right of possession so as to satisfy his debt and
the title becomes absolute in him at law, subject to be
defeated by the express or implied condition for an
equity of redemption by the mortgagor.
2The mortgage does not convey an absolute legal title
to the property mortgaged, for the reason that the mort-
gagor may sell and convey it, subject to such lion ; and
all a purchaser or subsequent encumbrancer need do is to
discharge the condition by complying with the provisions
of the mortgage ; so that, in this respect, there is no
distinction between mortgages of real and personal propee
ty prior to a forfeiture or breach of condition. A mort-
gagee after he obtains a mortgage is still a creditor,
the consideration for the mortgage is the debt ; and it
remains a debt until discharged or satisfied by payment
or sale under the mortgage, or by legal process. There
can be no mortgage, unless there is an equity of redemp-
tion ; it is this right which makes the transaction a
mortgage ; the very nature of' the transaction compels
and protects this right in the mortgagor. So that no
absolute title passes to the mortgagee wihen his instru-
ment is executed and recorded ; it gives him the same,
and no greater rights than a mortgagee of real property
has,--the right, upon default or breach of condition, to
subject the specific property described in the instrument
to the satisfaction of his debt in the manner provided
by statute, by the instrument itself or by due process
of law. If the execution of the mortgage and the deli-
very of possession paid the debt, it would be a sale if
possession is to be delivered, whether registered or not.
The execution of a chattel mortgage in the usual
form, invest the title in the mortgagee,,(1) subject to be
(1) Bragleman v Dane, 69 h.y. 69.
defeated by the subsequent perfonrance of the condition.
(1) The right of possession ordinarily follow that of
the property ; and both would pass under such an instru-
ment, in the absence of any express or implied agreement
for the retention of the chattels by the mortgagor. But
when the instrument specifically defines the circumstan-
ces under vwhich the rightof possession is to rest in the
mortgagee, the law implies an intent, that it is to re-
main in the meantime in the mortgagor, and until this
posse isory right of the mortgagor ceases, his interest
is subject to seizure and sale under legal process at
the instance of his creditors, and where the instrument
contains a clause giving the mortgagee, whenever he feels
unsafe and in good faith he can take possession of the
(1) West v Cravy 47 h.y. 423. Hayes v Wycroff 114
h.y. 207.
property and such an act terminates the mortgagor inter-
est to such an extent that he has no interest left sub-
ject to levy or sale.
The legal title becomes absolute upon default. (1)
It is not necessary that the instrument shall declare
that the defeasible title of the mortgagee shall become
absolute on default of the mortgagor to pay the sum
secured or any part thereof when it becomes due ; this
result follows as an incident to the relation of the
parties. But if the mortgagor fails to pay according
to the terms of the instrument his rights at law termi-
nate and his rights in equity come into being and this
right of the equity of redemption is liable to be ex-
tinguished.
(1) Bragelman v Dane 69 N. Y., 69.
6The general rule is, that after a default in the
condition of the mortgage the mortgagor has no interest
in the property mortgaged subject to be seized upon
execution, and this is so, even though the mortgagor
still retains possession of the property, it is equally
clear that the mortgagor has some interest in the prop-
erty after forfeiture of the condition. He has the
right of the equity of redemption until such right is
foreclosed.
Legal title on Default.
Where personal property is mortgaged the legal
title according to the New York rule passes to the
mortgagee and on default it becomes absolute in him,
the mortgagee can take possession and dispose of the
property. The only interest left in the mortgagor is
his equity of redemption and by exercising that right he
may redeem himself to the possession of the property and
so vest the legal title once more in himself. The
mortgagee may extinguish the equity of redemption by an
action to foreclose, either legal or equitable or by a
power of sale in the mortgage and the mortgagee may
purchase at his own sale if in good faith, and so have
the absolute title both equitable and legal in himself.
and
Until a chattel mortgage becomes absolute in the
mortgagee by non-performance of the condition of the
mortgage, the mortgagor has such an interest in the
chattel mortgage as is liable to a levy and sale on exe-
cution and the purchaser at the sale on execution takes
the property subject to the mortgage and acquires with
it a right to redeem it by payment of the amount due on
the mortgage. (1) But where the mortgagor is in posses-
sion of a chattel after forfeiture and the mortgagee can
take possession at his pleasure, there is no interest
left in the mortgagor subject of a sale on execution. (2)
It is well settled that where the porperty is in
the possession of the mortgagor after default for a
definite period, it is subject to a seizure upon execu-
(11 Champlin v Johnson 39 Barb. 606.
(2) Marsh v Lawrence 4 Cowen 467.
Hull v Carlney 11 N.Y. 505.Otis v Wood 3 Wend. 500
tion against him.
Although the absolute legal title is in the mortga-
gee after default and he has the right of possession,
yet while the property remains in the hands of the mort-
gagor after such default it is subject to seizure and
sale by a tax collector under tax warrant against such
mortgagor ; such is the law as authorized and enacted in
1 R. S. 398 sec. 2. relating to taxes, and in view of
this statute it is held that each individual of a com-
munity has notice of the law and is presumed to under-
stand that if his chattel are by his consent or permis-
sion in the possession of another they can be taken for
a tax against the person in possession. (1)
Legal title as effected by payment. As a general
(1) Hersee v Porter 100 N.Y. 410
10
rule the payment of the debt for which the mortgage is
a security, reinvest the title in the mortgagor and dis-
charges the mortgage. (1) Whenever the mortgagee after
default receives payment of the debt the mortgage will
be discharged, (2) the forfeiture for default is con-
sidered as having been waived, and the mortgagee's title
to the goods is undoubtedly extinguished, without any
resort to a court for a decree of redemption ; and the
mortgagor may at once bring his action at law for the
recovery of possession of the mortgaged property. (3)
But if there has been a default before tender or payment
has been made, the failure to pay the debt when due
operates to make the title of the mortgagee absolute and
at law the mortgagee could rightfully refuse a tender of
(1) Thompson v Van Vechten 27 N. Y. 568.
(2) West v Crary 47 N.Y. 423, Porter v Parmley 52 NY.188.
(3) Braun v Benent 8 Johns 95,Patchin v Pierce 12
Wend 61.
the debt after default.
There is a wide difference between a mortgage of
land and mortgage of chattels. In the first case as the
law in this state is now settled, the estate subject to
the mortgage, remains in the mortgagor and is bound a
judgment and may be sold under an execution against him,
the mortgage is regarded nearly as a lien or security for
the debt and not as a transfer of title. But a mortgage
of chattels in all cases, vest the legal title in the
mortgagee, and when by the terms or by the legal con-
struction of the instrument, he has an immediate right to
possession, although the possession may not in fact have
been changed, he is, in the judgments of law the absolute
owner, and it is merely as his bailee and by his suf-
france that the mortgagor retains the possession. The
latter has no interest that is bound by or can be sold
under an execution against him. When by the terms of
the mortgage the mortgagor is to remain in possession for
a certain time, his temporary interest, subject to the
mortgage may be levied upon and sold, but his interest
in other cases, is a right of redemption only, a mere
chose in action, which unless united to a right to pos-
session for a definite period can never be subject of a
levy and sale under execution.
The distinction, as laid down by text writers is
that in case of a pledge, the title remains in the
pledgor and the possession passed to the pledgee while
in the case of a chattel mortgage, the possession re-
mains with the mortgagor and the title passes to the
A pledge consists of a delivery of goods bymortgagee.
a debtor to his creditors, to be held until the debt or
obligation is discharged and then to be redelivered to
the pledgor ; the title not being changed, during the
continuance of the pledge nor is it effected by a de-
fault in the payment of the debt, the pledgor is divest-
ed of his title only when the property is sold by the
pledgee. While in the case of a mortgage, on default
the mortgagee's title to the goods becomes absolute, and
the mortgagor is divested of all rights in and to them,
except that he has still his equity of redemption.
It has been laid down by an eminent writer that
unless there be a delivery of the goods, there can be
no valid pledge. The delivery must be an actual and
continued, except in one or two classes of cases, where
constructive delivery is tolerated. The reason for the
strictness of rule in delivery is quite obvious.
not essential to a valid pledge that the terms of it
should be in writing and a public record made of it for
the reason that in every valid pledge the creditor is
found in possession of the goods, and that fact together
with the absence of possession in the debtor, is a suf-
ficient publication of the transaction to other parties
dealing with him.
It is
Forms and Requisites.
As a general rule no particular words or form of
conveyance is necessary to constitute a chattel mort-
gage. A mortgage made entirely by parol, will be valid
as between the parties and if the mortgagee takes poses-
sion it will be good as to third parties. (1) A chattel
mortgage in its execution does not require such exactness
and formality as a mortgage of real property and, in facV
no particular words seem to be required to constitute a
good mortgage, beyond the requirement that the instrument
which was intended to operate as a mortgage, must contain
words sufficient to transfer the title of the goods to
the mortgagee. Whenever a conveyance or assignment of
(1) Bank of Rochester v Jones 4 N.Y. 498.
property is originally intended as a security for money,
whether this intention appears from the conveyance itself
or any other instrument, it is always considered as a
mortgage, and redeemable, even though there is an agree-
ment of the parties that it shall not be redeemable, or
that the right of redemption shall be confined to a par-
ticular time or a particular description of persons. A
chattel mortgage need not be under seal, in this it dif-
fers from a real estate mortgage. Personal property
could always be transfered without the use of a deed
while real property can not. A seal never has been held
necessary to a bill of sale of personality while it is
otherwise as to real property. (1) A mortgage may be
payable in instalments and it generally occurs when the
(1) Thompson v Blonshard 4 N.Y. 303.
amount secured is larger than what the mortgagor can pay
at any one time; so for the benefit of both it may be
made payable in several instalments or at different pe-
riods and where the principle is not made payable at any
such time the interest may ; so there may be a default
by the mortgagor in the payment of the interest, if not
in the principle debt secured. In case of this kind
where there ia a provision in the mortgage that in de-
fault of payment of interest or of the principle, the
whole sum shall become due and payable ; the non-payment
of either principle or interest is such a breach of the
condition or forfeiture as will give the mortgagee the
right to immediate possession of the property and make
the whole sum due and payable at once and the mortgagee's
right becomes perfect on default of one instalment of in-
terest or principle as upon default in the payment of
the whole debt.
Whether an instrument is to be regarded as an ab-
solute conveyance or a mortgage, depends upon the cir-
cumstances under which it was made, and the relation sub-
sisting between the parties and not exclusive, nor even
chiefly upon their agreement. When it is doubtful whe-
ther a transaction was a mortgage or a conditional sale,
the intention of the parties will control the transaction
and form of the contract, and the circumstances under
which it was executed may be looked into in determining
what was their intentions. A bill of sale of chattels
may be shown to be a mortgage by the same evidence that
would produce that effect. A bill of sale absolute upon
its face, transfering property to be held as security
for the payment of a debt, is in character and effect
a mortgage and is to be treated as such.
A mortgage is void as to creditors, which provides
for a substitution of other property to take the place
of the property described in the mortgage. So is a
mortgage which by its terms, the privilege is granted
to the mortgagor to sell for his own benefit, and as his
own portions of the property covered by the mortgage,
this renders the instrument fraudulent and void upon its
face. Such agreements can have only one purpose, and
that is to hinder and delay and defraud creditors. The
time of payment should be named in a chattel mortgage,
(1) Smith v Berthie 31 N. Y. 542.
otherwise it is due irrmediately and the right of possession
and absolute legal title vest at once in the mortgagee
and he has right to recover the property against the
mortgagor or any other person claiming under him, but
where the possession is reserved to the mortgagor sub-
ject to be defeated by a demand of the performance of the
condition, the mortgagor has possession until such de-
mand.
The Parties.
The general rule as to who may make a chattel mort-
gage is, that any owner of personal property, or his
duly authorized agent, may execute a valid mortgage
the only exception being infants and insane persons. So
far as the insane persons and infants, person's contract
are not void, but voidable; the mortgage is enforciblc
until the infant determines to avoid it. And he is not
prevented from avoiding the mortgage because he has con-
sumed the consideration of the mortgage, and cannot re-
store the mortgagee to his original position. (1) But if
the consideration of the mortgage has not been consumed
or disposed of, and can therefore be returned to the
(1) Green v Green 7 Hun 492.
mortgagee, the mortgagor cannot avoid the mortgage with-
out returning the consideration. Thus, if the property
mortgaged had been bought from the mortgagee,and the
mortgage had been given to secure the purchase money, the
mortgage property would have to be returned, before the
mortgage could be avoided.
Partners are mutual agents of each other in all
things which respect a partnership business and the act
of one in such things is the act of an agent of all. A
pledge or mortgage by one partner of partnership property
will bind his co-partners ; although it be made without
their knowledge,(2) provided the mortgagee had no notice
that it was joint property, and there be no fraud in the
transaction. One partner has authority to sell and trans-
(1) v Fennemore 17 Barb. 428.
(2) Stewart v Slater 6 Duer 96.
fer all the copartnership effects directly to creditors
of the firm although the latter is at the place of busi-
ness and might be consulted. As a mortgage of personal
property need not be under seal and as a mortgage of
such property of a firm, made by one of the partners to
secure a debt of the firm, is valid, the addition by him
of a seal does not violate it. (1)
As to individual debts one partner cannot mortgage
copartnership property and such a mortgage would be of
no effect to the extent only of the interest of the mort-
gagor, and the equities of the other partners and part-
nership creditors would attach. Since the interest of
an individual partner consist only of his share of the
surplus remaining after the payment of the debts and
(1) Milton v Masher 7 Met 244.
24
settlement of the accounts of the firm, there would be
no acttal lien on the property ; and it is not until that
interest is ascertained and set apart as the share of
the mortgagor that his mortgage is available against any
specific property.
Corporations have power to mortgage both their real
and personal property unloss restrained by their charter
for the purpose of securing debts either for debts or
other considerations, but as to their franchise, it can-
not be mortgaged except under a statute allowing such.
The power to mortgage corporate property is co-extensive
with the power to alienate it absolutely. Thus)author-
ity given to a company by special act of the legislature
to transfer all its property and rights to another cor-
25
poration, confers upon it authority to mortgage its pro-
perty and rights to others. And, generally, a charter
conferring the right to acquire a lien, transfer and
dispose of property of every kind, confers power to mort
gage. So, also, if a corporation, besides being author-
ized to acquire, purchase, dispose of and convey real
and personal property, is empowered to negotiate its pa-
per and to borrow money, it has power to mortgage its
property to secure the loan.
The power of trading corporations to mortgage its
property as security for money borrowed in the prosecu-
tion of its business exist by implication in the absence
of charter limitations. Although to mortgage the whole
corporate property includes the right to mortgage prop-
erty in whatever way acquired and for debts whenever in-
26
curred or to mortgage any part of the property.
Description of Property.
The description of property intended to be mort-
gaged, should be such as to distinguish from other simi-
lar articles or should contain some hint or direct the
attention of such parties who may read or exanine the
mortgage to any source of information beyond the words
of the parties to it, or should be such as to enable a
third person to identify the property, aided by inquiries
which the mortgage itself indicates and directs. But
between the mortgagor and mortgagee such specific de-
scription is not necessary. (1) Chattel mortgages are
often made on part of a lot of property and in cases of
this kind questions constantly arise between creditors
(1) Conklin v Shelly 28 N. Y., 360.
19 N. Y. 123.
Harding v Coburn 12 Met. 333.
Gardner v McEwen
and the mortgagees as to which portion of the property is
or was intended to be covered by the mortgage. When-
ever it becomes necessary to identify the property de-
scribed in a mortgage from other property of a similar
kind or show what was intended to be conveyed, extrinsic
evidence is admissible. (1) If at the time of making
the mortgage the description is sufficiently definite
to ascertain the property mortgage, the mortgagor can-
not by his acts so effect the property by changing or
mixing it with other property or otherwise effect it so
as to impair the mortgagee's lien. (2)
Where a mortgage covers articles of a particular
kind in a place with other similar articles belonging to
(1) Dodge v Potter 18 Barb. 193.
7 Met. 354.
(2) Dunning v Stearns 9 Barb. 630.
Barry v Bennet
the mortgagor and a separation is necessary, the right
of selection is given to the rortgagee, but such a de-
scription can vest no title as to third persons. Where
the description fails to describe the property a delivery
of it to the mortgagee will make the mortgage good.
The intention of the parties is the principle point in
the construction of a chattel mortgage and should always
be followed by the courts in interpreting the instrument.
If the mortgage provides for the annexation of a sched-
ule or enumeration of the things which are covered by
the mortgage(l), or contains a reference to a schedule
or description to be found in some other deed or mort-
gage, the scope of the mortgage is generally detemiined
by the terms of the schedule ; and if the schedule is
(1) Edgell v. lart 9 N. Y., 215.
omitted, after being referred to in the mortgage, the
mortgage is invalid, unless it contains some independent
general description which is sufficiently definite to
identify the property mortgaged in whole or in part. (1)
If there is a conflict between the mortgage and the
schedule, the former must control, as a schedule is only
a means of ascertaining with more cer-tainty the property
covered by the mortgage (2), but the scope of the mort-
gage cannot be so enlarged by the general description as
to include things unlike those which are specifically
described. (3)
(1) Van Husen v. Radcliffe 17 N. Y., 580
(2) Matthews v. Sniffen 10 Daby, 200.
(3) Russell v. Winne 37 N. Y., 591.
Execution and Delivery.
When the instrument is in proper form, the next
step is to deliver it to the mortgagee and have it ex-
ecuted. Since a chattel mortgage is of no effect with-
out a delivery and acceptance it is evident that delivery
is one of the essential incidents to the execution of
the instrument. (1) Delivery means a transfer from the
mortgagor to the mortgagee of such a nature as to show
the intention of the parties, and its effect is to change
the title that is to vest the .nortgagor legal title in
the mortgagee and it is always essential so as to prefect
the mortgagee title as regards to the rights of third
persons. No particular form is required in delivery,
it may be made by words, acts or the combination of them
(1) Jones on Chattel Mortgages, 106.
both, the rule as to contracts in offer and acceptance
apply to mortgages. It is not necessary for either of
the parties to do these acts in person. The delivery,
as well as the acceptance, may be done for the mortgagor
and mortgagee respectively by their duly authorized
agent. (1) While a delivery of the mortgage to the
recorder for registration is not in itself sufficient
to support a presumption that the mortgagee has accepted
the mortgage, and hence not sufficient to pass title to
the mortgaged property(2)not even when it is shown that
the mortgagee knows of the execution of the mortgage and
of its delivery to the recorder ; yet if the delivery to
the recorder is in pursuance of the agreement of the
parties to the mortgage, there will be sufficient evidence
(1) Brownell v. Hawkins 4 Barb., 491.
(2) Dale v. Bodman 3 Met. 139.
of delivery and acceptance,in order to pass title. But
the agreement must relate specifically to the mortgage
which is recordedin order to be equivalent to an acceptance.
An agreement that whenever a mortgage is executed
it shall be delivered to the recorder, is held to be
insufficient proof of acceptance. The possession
of the note and mortgage by the mortgagee supports the
presumption that they have been duly delivered and
accepted. On the other hand, the possession of
these papers by the mortgagor raises the presumption
either that they have not been deliveied, or that they
have been satisfied. As long as the rights of third
parties have not intervened, the mortgagee may accept
the mortgage at any subsequent time. It is a question
of fact for the jury whether there has been a delivery
Where the mortgage is given to
secure two or more debts payable to different persons,
it is not necessary to deliver the mortgage to each
mortgagee. Delivery to one is sufficient.
If a chattel mortgage be dated, it is presumed that
it was executed on the given day, but it is admissible
to prove a mistake in the mortgage date. (2) And if the
mortgage contains no date, it is always possible to prove
by parol evidence when the mortgage was executed. But
it is not possible to show that the day of execution was
later than the day of acknowledgement, unless you like-
wise prove an error in the latter date.
mortgage need not be under seal. (3) T
A chattel
here is this
distinction between personal and real property : person-
(1) Robertson v Jackson 1 Wend. 478.
(2) Fuller v Acker 1 Hill 173.
(3) Dispatch Line v Bellamy Co. 12 N. H. 205.
and acceptance. (1)
al property could always be transferred without the use
of a deed ; while real property could not. A seal
never has been held necessary to a bill of sale of
personalty ; while all conveyances of real property are
sealed by the parties executing it. (1)
The execution of a chattel mortgage, and the filing
of the same, without the knowledge or authority of the
mortgagee, is unsufficient. The carrying of an instru-
ment to an office to be filed or recorded is not a
delivery, nor evidence of a grantee's acceptance, (2)
unless it is deposited and left in charge of the registe4
for the use of the mortgagee, and the mortgagor intends
to part with the possession and all power and control
over the instrument ; but where a mortgage is sent to
(1) Milton v Mosher 7 Met. 244.
(2) Jackson v Phipps 12 Johns. 418.
the recorder's office by the mortgagor, without the
knowledge of the mortgagee, and is wholly subject to
the mortgagor's control, with no intent of present
delivery, it is invalid. And, though made effectual
by a subsequent acceptance, or a satisfaction of the
mortgage, it cannot effect the rights of another, which
mortgagee acquired by a prior satisfaction of a mortgage
to him of the same property recorded at the same time.
